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SECURITY INFORMATION

EAWA-4333

GRCROOND

Chief, EE  
Attn: ☐  
Chief of Base, Vienna

23. Sep. 1953

Operational/GRBOUNCE

KUGOWN Agent Training

Reference: EAW-1789

*Memorandum for Agent Training*

Info: Salz

1. The reference dispatch was forwarded from the EE Division 25 August 1953. It was received by the Vienna Base 2 September 1953. It was not, therefore, possible to meet the required date of 1 September 1953.

2. As a matter of operational policy, we do not believe agents should be exposed to expert instructors in other than highly technical fields such as W/T. Tradecraft is best taught, in our opinion by the agent handler. Coincidentally, it is usually possible for a skillful case officer to bolster the agent's motivation by exchange of ideas, political discussions and by reference to books and periodicals available to the agent. We are therefore opposed to agent training centers and travelling political indoctrination experts. We recognize the fact that many KUBARK case officers lack the background, experience, knowledge and intelligence to influence certain agents likely to be found in the political action field. However, until we have exposed our younger officers to these problems and to this type agent, it is unlikely that the officers will ever have any real understanding of the problems involved in recruiting, training and maintaining agents. If our present case officer cadre proves incapable of handling political action agents properly, then we must obtain a new group of case officers, or wait until our present officers gain the necessary experience. We must not be deluded into a compromise of basic agent handling techniques by the seemingly easy solution presented by training centers or visiting lecturers.

3. In reference to the "Outline" included with reference, the following is submitted:

1. The following are the Austrian Mission KUGOWN Principal Agents and agents, with functions as indicated. All are under direct case officer supervision except for GRCLOGGY 2 and GRCLOGGY 3.

a. GRSPINAL 1: Principal Agent, in charge of editorial and business management of two daily newspapers and one weekly illustrated review.

b. GRDAGGER 1: Principal Agent, in charge of over-all direction of a political action apparatus sometimes also used for propaganda distribution purposes, with additional supplementary responsibilities for KUHOOK phases of the project.

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c. GRDAGGER 2: Agent, assisting GRDAGGER 1 in both KUGOWN and KUHOOK aspects of the project.

d. GRCLOGGY 1: Principal Agent, responsible (under direct case officer supervision) for writing, editing and distributing black propaganda leaflets and pamphlets.

e. GRCLOGGY 2: Agent, assists in addressing and mailing propaganda items.

f. GRCLOGGY 3: Agent, with same functions as GRCLOGGY 2.

2. Activity may be increased, but it is not likely to change appreciably in content.

3. No KUGOWN agents will need training other than that given by the case officer.

4. Although we may hope to have agents in most of these categories in the future, they will be trained by their case officer.

5. The agents will need training in Tradecraft, the principles of psychological warfare and propaganda. The agents must have area knowledge, prior to recruitment. Coincidentally with the recruitment of the agent and his subsequent development of the agent, the case officer will attempt to determine the agent's motivation and to bolster or redirect it if need be.

6. Our agents are normally available two or three evenings during the month, sometimes a like period during the day. Experience shows that agents cannot reasonably be expected to devote vacations, and long weekends to intelligence schools.

7. We do not feel that we can undertake the indirect training of persons who are unwittingly involved in KUBARK operations in 1954.

8. U.S. contract agents in the KUGOWN field will need basically the same training given the indigenous agents -- tradecraft, psychological warfare principles. If recruited in the U.S. for duty here, covert training in the U.S. would be helpful. It is not expected that any such agents will be sent to Austria in 1954.

a.

9./ All agents listed in paragraph 3.1 above can be adequately trained by their case officers.

b. We have no full-time training officers, but can make available part of the time of some thirty case officers who are qualified to teach agents tradecraft. Two or three of our staff have a good understanding of and could train psychological warfare agents in German, Russian and French.

c. Generally speaking, Principal Agents will be able to give necessary training to sub-agents. In any event, it will not be feasible to introduce a staff officer or other agent to do the training.

d. We have a variety of safehouses in the Vienna area where training sessions may be held. We do not foresee the need for other psychological warfare training areas in 1954.

10. We do not expect to send any agents to the U.S. for training in 1954.

11. a. We should like all available material on psychological warfare for staff officer training and orientation.

b. We do not plan to send any case officers home for additional training. We believe this can best be given before the case officer is sent to the field. If a radical change in training occurs, case officers may take additional courses upon return to the U.S. on home leave.

22 September 1953

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